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INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear criticality accident descriptions typically 
include, but do not focus on, information useful to first 
responders. [1] We studied these accidents, noting 
characteristics to help (1) first responders prepare for such 
an event and (2) emergency drill planners develop 
appropriate simulations for training. We also provide 
recommendations to help people prepare for such events 
in the future. 
ACCIDENT SUMMARY 
Table I summarizes accident characteristics based on 
a 60 accident review that neglects victim-specific 
information.  
In addition to Table I observations, automatic alarms 
usually provided the first process accident indicator for 
people who were not very near or watching the source:  
x Fourteen accidents occurred in areas covered by a 
criticality alarm system.  
x Three accidents in well shielded areas, and one in a 
facility for which such accidents were deemed 
incredible, occurred in areas with radiation, but no 
criticality, alarm coverage.  
x Three process accidents occurred in areas that lacked 
criticality and radiation alarms, presumably because 
criticality accidents were deemed incredible.  
x One process accident occurred in a critical assembly 
area for which alarms are not described. 
Criticality alarms are not required in reactor and 
critical assembly facilities because their systems usually 
achieve the critical state intentionally. These facilities 
have other instrumentation, but accident descriptions 
rarely include relevant alarms.  
VICTIM SUMMARY 
These 60 accidents resulted in 21 fatalities and 29 
other people with acute radiation injury. All seriously 
exposed persons suffered acute radiation sickness. At 
least seven suffered permanent disabilities, including at 
least four with limb amputations.  
We therefore studied 23 accidents (Table II) in depth, 
focusing on accidents that resulted in fatalities or 
significant physical injuries to exposed victims, from 
shortly before the critical excursion until the victim was 
taken offsite for treatment. With 11 process and 12 non-
process events, the list includes all accidents that resulted 
in exposures of at least 1 Gy.  
Table III summarizes observed characteristics.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
x Anticipate the accident, but do not over-predict the 
scenario. 
x Train and drill workers and responders well regarding 
criticality safety factors and controls, making 
observations, and executing protective measures. 
x Prepare responders to gather and report observations. 
x Prepare responders to deal with victims with a wide 
range of exposures and behaviors. 
x Prepare responders to deal with incidental workers 
and, especially when the public is near facility 
boundaries, the worried well.
x Prepare workers and responders for initial reactions 
that range from precisely executed tasks to ordered 
confusion to chaos. 
x Do not allow rescue or reconnaissance entries 
without absolute justification and good planning. 
x Do not attempt to terminate or stabilize a critical 
system until the system is well understood and 
actions are well planned, staffed, and practiced. 
x Implement ANSI/ANS-8.23 where appropriate. [2] 
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TABLE I. Numbers of Accidents with Observed Characteristics 
Characteristic 
Process 
Accidents 
Non-Process 
Accidents Total 
Nuclear criticality accident 22 38 60 
Public exposures  0.01 Sv 0 0 0 
Worker exposures  0.01 Sv 18 17 35 
Worker exposures  0.12 Gy  14 13 27 
Worker exposures ~  1.00 Gy 11 12 23 
One or more fatalities 6 8 14 
One-burst power history 5 35 40 
Power history  5 minutes  15(a) 2 or 3(b)  17 
Terminated by human intervention  8  6  14 
Secondary burst due to unplanned response actions 2 0 2 
Significant contamination locally/outside building/off-site 5 / 2 / 0 8 / 3 / 0 13 / 5 / 0 
Significant industrial injuries incurred during response 0 1 1 
(a) The longest history was terminated after about 37 hours in April 1962 in Hanford, WA USA. 
(b) The longest history was terminated after about 158 hours in June 1997 in Sarov, Russia. 
TABLE II. 23 Accidents Reviewed in Depth 
Location and 
Year(s) 
Fatal
Exposures 
Others 
 1 Gy 
Others 
0.01 Sv
(a)
Location and 
Year(s) 
Fatal
Exposures 
Others 
 1 Gy 
Others 
0.01 Sv
(a)
Argonne, IL 
USA 1952 
0 2 2 
Mol, Belgium 
1965
0 1 0 
Arzamaz-16 / 
Sarov, Russia 
1963, 1997 
1 2 4 or 5 
NRTS (SL-1), 
ID USA 1961 
3
(b)
 0 22 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, 1983 
1 0 8 
Oak Ridge 
(Y-12), TN USA 
1958
0 5 3 
Chelyabinsk-70, 
USSR 1968 
2 0 0 
Siberian Chem. 
Comp., USSR 
1961, 1978 
0 2 7 
Hanford, WA 
USA 1962
(b) 0 0 5 
Tokaimura, 
Japan 1999 
2 1 0 
Kurchatov 
Institute, USSR 
1971a, 1971b 
2 4 2 or 3 
Vinþa,
Yugoslavia 1958 
1 5 0 
Los Alamos, 
NM USA 1945, 
1946, 1958 
3 5 15 
Wood River 
Junction, RI 
USA 1964 
1 1 3 
Mayak, USSR 
1953, 1957, 
1958, 1968 
5 9 7     
(a) Includes worker exposures received during accident response, investigation, and cleanup. 
(b) SL-1 fatalities were due to physical injuries, but radiation doses would have been fatal for all three victims 
without evacuation. 
TABLE III.  Additional Characteristics Noted in 23 Accidents 
# of Accidents Initial Indicator of Serious Accident As Observed by Closest Worker(s) 
17 / 3 Reported/assumed to be self evident (light flash, heat, etc.) 
2 Onset of illness 
3 High radiation field detected (including radiation alarm) without criticality alarm 
6 Criticality alarms immediately after (confirmed other indicators)  
2 Other (dosimetry evaluation, ozone smell, etc.) 
# of Accidents Serious-accident-recognition Rapidity by Closest Worker(s)(a) -/- Organizations  
17 / 2  -/- 8 / 6 Reported/assumed immediate ( 5 minutes after 1st achieving keff  1.0 during event) 
1 / 0  -/- 2 / 2 Reported/assumed moderate (5 to 15 minutes) 
1 / 0  -/- 3 / 1 Reported/assumed slow (> 15 minutes) 
2 / 0  -/- 2 / 0 Identified by techniques that were not employed within 30 minutes of critical event 
# of Accidents Methods initiated within 30 minutes to Quickly Identify Overexposed Workers 
2 / 1 
24
Na in blood (quick-sort), reported/assumed 
10 Behavior, illness, interviews 
2 Other  
8 Not identified in readily available accident descriptions 
# of Accidents Consequences for Early Responders, Not Including Victims Acting As Responders  
1 / 0 Rescued victims with fatal/non-fatal exposures at the immediate scene 
0 / 1 Received exposures over 0.01 Sv that were more/less than 1.00 Gy 
# of Workers Exposures Due to 9 Accidents with  5 Minute Power History 
5 / 1 Fatal exposures among workers on/off-scene during initial critical state 
17 / 1 Others,  1.00 Gy among workers on/off-scene during initial critical state 
16 / 2 Others,  0.01 Sv among workers on or near/off-scene during initial critical state 
# of Workers Radiation Sickness(b) for Fatal(a) / Non-fatal,   ~1 Gy / about 0.12 to < ~1 Gy Exposures 
18 / 40 / 42 Relevant exposures (max. # if exposure statistics expressed in ranges) 
3 / 0 / 0 Immediate (< 5 minutes) onset of illness 
5 / 2 / 0 Rapid (5 to 30 minutes) onset of illness 
2 / 1 / 0 Moderate (30 minutes to few hours) onset of illness 
0 / 12 / 0 Slow (few hours to one day) onset of illness 
0 / 3 / 0 Very slow (>1 day) onset of illness 
0 / 0 / 21 No visible symptoms, apparently 
8 / 22
(c)
 / 21 Onset of illness or lack of symptoms not identified in readily available descriptions 
# of Workers Behavior of Some Victims with   ~1 Gy Exposure 
1 / 1 Incoherent almost immediately, but left immediate scene with/without assistance 
56 Sufficiently coherent and ambulatory to evacuate and, if appropriate, shower 
2 Collapsed completely within minutes 
2 Denied presence at accident scene (anecdotal information) 
 8 Acted as responder or expert (e.g. provided reports, estimated doses, etc.)(d)
5 Altered evidence (e.g. attempt stabilization, hide guilt, etc.) before evacuation  
1 / 1 Altered evidence during re-entry, leading to fatal /  ~ 1Gy exposure 
# of Workers Contamination in Addition to Irradiation While On-site 
7 / 2 Reported/assumed significantly contaminated personnel with  ~ 1Gy exposure 
(a) SL-1 victims are excluded because they died of physical injuries.  By the time rescuers arrived, two 
victims were dead and the third was unconscious.  However, all three had received fatal doses. 
(b) It might be difficult to distinguish very mild or early radiation sickness from stress or anxiety because 
some of their readily observable symptoms (headache, nausea, feeling hot) are the same.  In all cases, 
medical treatment was based on symptoms; dose estimates played little or no role. In the future, early 
information about relative distances from the source to major body parts might help physicians predict 
symptoms to assist in identifying and preparing for potentially useful treatments. 
(c) No or very mild radiation sickness is specifically identified for five exposures of about 1 to 3 Gy. 
(d) Victim actions and decisions were good in some cases, but, even then, a few decisions appear to have been 
questionable or bad.  Victims are very stressed regardless of appearance.   
